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Regulating Genetic Discrimination in the
European Union
Pushing the EU into Unchartered Territory or Ushering in a New
Genomic Era?
Aisling de Paor & Delia Ferri*
Abstract
Against the backdrop of rapid developments in genetic science and technology, one
of the main concerns arising in this area is the potential use of genetic testing to
discriminate, especially in the employment and insurance contexts. Employers and
insurance companies may use the results of genetic tests to discriminate (primarily
for economic advantage), based on perceptions of future health risks or future disa-
bilities. This article explores the scope for an EU to effectively address genetic dis-
crimination and the misuse of genetic information. It first provides a theoretical
overview of the choice of regulatory frameworks. It then examines the scope and
protection of current non- discrimination laws in the EU and investigates the possi-
bility of an EU level response to address the misuse of genetic information.
Keywords: genetics, regulation, discrimination, data protection, European Union.
A Introduction
In the last decade, genetic testing has become more sophisticated, more accessi-
ble, and therefore increasingly more widespread. Public attitudes towards genetic
testing itself are generally positive,1 since it allows diagnosis of inherited diseases
and offers the potential to detect future disabilities. It is generally acknowledged
that genetic science and technology has been displaying a great potential to pre-
vent and treat illnesses.
Despite this welcoming attitude, concerns have constantly risen in relation to
the potential breach of genetic privacy by interested third parties as a result of
* BCL, LLM, PhD, Solicitor (Law Society of Ireland) - Lecturer in Law, Dublin City University.
LLM, PhD in European and Italian constitutional law, Attorney at Law registered at the Verona
Bar (Italy) - Lecturer in Law, National University of Ireland Maynooth.
1 L. Henneman & I. Van Hoyweghen, 'Moving beyond Public Fear of Genetic Discrimination',
Health and Ageing Newsletter 28, April 2013. Available at <www.genevaassociation.org/media/
77290/ga2013-health28-hennemanvan hoyweghen.pdf> (accessed 30 November 2013).
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unauthorised access, disclosure, and use of such information.2 In addition, the
uneasy fear that genetic information can be misused to discriminate against a
person is rapidly growing.3 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as
independent human rights actors often denounce the increased and actual risks
of discrimination for individuals:4 for example, in the United States, according to
the Coalition for Genetic Fairness, employers have considered a genetic test as a
predictor of the future health of an employee and of his/her level of future absen-
teeism or low work rate. The Coalition reported several cases of exclusion of job
applicants on the basis of predicted future health.5 The UK Human Genetics
Commission (HGC) 6 in 2002 recommended that consideration needed to be given
to specific legislation protecting people against discrimination on the basis of
genetics, and most recently in 2011, it stated the necessity to monitor evidence of
genetic discrimination and keep the need for legislative change under review.
7
Legal literature has expressed a major concern that genetic discrimination may
leave a class of people who cannot work and are uninsurable.
8
To address potential misuses of genetic information, a body of international
soft and hard law documents on the use of genetic testing and emerging biotech-
nology techniques has been developed.9 The most relevant example of interna-
tional binding law is the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology
and Medicine (Oviedo Convention), approved by the Council of Europe in 1997,
which bans all forms of discrimination based on a person's genetic features and
allows predictive genetic tests only for health or scientific research purposes. 10 In
2 For further discussion see M. Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy
Protection, Cambridge University Press 2012. See also G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to
Medico - Legal Norms, Cambridge University Press 2002.
3 E. Geelen et al., 'Unravelling Fears of Genetic Discrimination: An Exploratory Study of Dutch
HCM Families in an Era of Genetic Non- Discrimination Acts', EJHG, Vol. 20, 2012,
pp. 1018-1023.
4 M. Otlowski et al., 'Practices and Attitudes of Australian Employers in Relation to the Use of
Genetic Information: Report on a National Study', Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol.
31, 2009-2010, p. 637; A. de Paor, 'The Regulation of Genetic Information in Ireland - Does It
Strike an Appropriate Balance of Rights?', MLJI, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2013, p. 97.
5 For further details see <www.geneticfairness.org> (accessed 21 March 2014).
6 The HGC was established in 2000 to provide the UK Governments with advice on the ethical,
legal, and social issues arising from Human Genetics and it adopted different approaches in vari-
ous pieces of its work. It was disbanded in 2012.
7 HGC, The Concept of Genetic Discrimination: A Seminar Report and Reflections and Recommen-
dations 2011, at <www.cloisters.com/news-pdf-downloads/cathys-pdf.pdf>.
8 A. Somek, 'Genetic Discrimination', Society, 2003, p. 36. See also M.A. Rothstein & B. Knoppers,
'Legal Aspects of Genetics, Work and Insurance in North America and Europe', EJHL, Vol. 3,
1996, p. 143
9 T. Lemke, Perspectives on Genetic Discrimination, Routledge 2013.
10 C. Campiglio, 'I1 principio di non discriminazione genetica nella recente prassi internazionale',
Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2008, pp. 513-534; IV. Motoc, 'The International Law of
Genetic Discrimination: The Power of Never Again', in T. Murphy (Ed.), New Technologies and
Human Rights, Oxford University Press 2009; J. Beqiraj, 'Prohibition of Genetic Discrimination:
Applicative Perspectives under the Lens of Human Rights Protection', La Comunita internazionale,
2011, pp. 91-112.
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addition, national legislation has been enacted as a reaction to the increasing
fears about the misuse of genetic data and in order to protect people discrimina-
ted against on the ground of genetic information. The most significant example is
the US Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA), passed in 2008.
Also, several European Member States have approved specific provisions to pro-
tect genetic data and, in some cases, to ban their discriminatory use.
11
Within the European Union (EU), this scattered and dissimilar legislative
response to questions of genetic privacy and genetic discrimination has resulted
in a 'patchwork' of national legislative acts with no common ground. These differ-
ent legislative approaches, focusing on the protection of access to and disclosure
of an individual's genetic information or on the prevention of a discriminatory
use of genetic data, still reflect national and cultural differences with regards to
genetics, but also diverse social welfare systems. 1 2 Yet, there is a general percep-
tion that this legislative 'patchwork' is detrimental to the actual protection of EU
citizens and is a threat to the principle of non-discrimination, which is deeply
rooted in the EU legal order.
The need for an EU level response to the risk generated by the widespread use
of genetic testing has been advocated for long. In 1989, the European Parliament
called for an EU ban of the use of genetic testing in insurance matters to elimi-
nate the risks of discrimination. 13 In 2003, the Group on Ethics in Science and
11 E. Stefanini, Datigenetici e diritti fondamentali. Proflli di diritto comparato ed europeo, Cedam 2008;
M.A. Rothstein & Y. Joly, 'Genetic Information and Insurance Underwriting: Contemporary
Issues and Approaches in the Global Economy', in P. Atkinson et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Genetics
and Society: Mapping the New Genomic Era, Routledge 2009; M.T. Annecca, 'Test Genetici e Diritti
della Persona', in S. Canestrari et al. (Eds.), Trattato di Biodiritto. I Governo del Corpo, Giuffre
2011, pp. 391-422; Lemke 2013, p. 27; A. de Paor, 'US and EU Perspectives on Genetic Discrimi-
nation in Employment and Insurance: Striking a Balance in a Battlefield of Competing Rights?',
in L. Waddington et al. (Eds.), European Yearbook of Disability Law, Vol. 4, Intersentia 2013, pp.
99-144. For example, the Belgian Law of 28 January 2003 prohibits the use of genetic testing
and genetic screening in employment, and the subsequent law of 8 October 2004 prohibits dis-
crimination on the ground of genetic data. In France, Law 2004-800 on bioethics allows for
genetic tests only for health or scientific research purposes and the Code Penal prohibits discrim-
ination on the ground of genetic features (Article 225, para. 1). In Italy, the privacy regulation
(Legislative Decree 196/2003) allows for the use of genetic data only upon authorization of the
National Privacy Authority. See M. Croce, 'Genetica umana e diritto: problemi e prospettive', Jura
Gentium Rivista di filosofia, del diritto internazionale e della politica globale 2008. Available at
<www.juragentium.org/topics/rights/it/croce.htm> (access 30 November 2013); R. Lattanzi,
'Ricerca Genetica e Protezione dei Dati Personali', in Canestrari et al. 2011, pp. 319, 338. In the
UK, people who have actual symptoms of a genetic disorder meet the definition of disabled and
are covered by the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA), whilst people whose genetic data predict
a later genetic disorder or a higher probability to a disease do not enjoy any legal protection. In
Austria, Denmark, and The Netherlands, genetic testing for employment purposes is illegal. Part
4 of the Irish Disability Act 2005 regulates genetic testing in a number of third party contexts,
including insurance, employment, and the mortgaging of property, by prohibiting the processing
of genetic data in these contexts.
12 S. Soini, 'Genetic Testing Legislation in Western Europe - A Fluctuating Regulatory Target', Jour-
nal of Community Genetics, Vol. 3, 2012, p. 143. See also 0. Varga et al., 'Definitions of Genetic
Testing in European Legal Documents', Journal of Community Genetics, Vol. 3, 2012, p. 125.
13 European Parliament's Resolution on the ethical and legal problems concerning genetic manipu-
lation, 16 March 1989.
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New Technologies (EGE) called for urgent EU action on genetic discrimination.
Further, Article 21(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights specifically pro-
vides for, inter alia, 'genetic features' as a ground of discrimination. 1 4 However, at
the time of the writing of this article, the EU has not legislated yet in this field.
The proposal for a new non-discrimination directive, which is currently under dis-
cussion, does not mention genetic data, nor genetic discrimination. The EU is also
currently engaged in a reform of legislation on data protection, which would
introduce 'genetic data' among the categories of sensitive data,15 but the entry
into force of this reformed legal framework should not be expected too soon
(despite the commitment of the new Juncker Commission, officially approved by
the European Parliament on 22 October 2014).16
Against this background, this article critically discusses the desirability of EU
legislation to ban genetic discrimination and the extent of EU competence to leg-
islate in this field.
This article does not examine ethical issues related to genetic testing, nor the
complex regulatory issues linked to genetic testing in the clinical setting. Never-
theless, before addressing the EU's role in protecting genetic data and prohibiting
genetic discrimination, this article explores the merits of adopting a stand-alone
legislative approach and briefly addresses the concept of 'genetic exceptionalism'.
This article is structured as follows. Following the introduction, Section B dis-
cusses, in a general fashion, the extent to which genetic discrimination is
addressed in the current EU legal framework and tries to evaluate the 'gaps' of
protection in the current legal framework. Section C addresses the desirability of
an EU directive banning genetic discrimination and is divided into four subsec-
tions. First it examines the desirability of an ad hoc piece of legislation. Then it
highlights the choice of regulatory frameworks in legal theory and discusses the
meaningfulness of the non-discrimination approach. The fourth subsection of the
Section C analyses the extent of EU competence to pass a new ad hoc non-discrim-
ination genetic information directive. Section D formulates some tentative con-
clusions.
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union officially proclaimed on 7 December
2000, Official Journal of the European Communities, 18 December 2000, [2000] OJ C 364/01,
and now published on Official Journal of the European Union 26 October 2012 [2012] OJ C
326/391.
15 On 25 January 2012, the Commission adopted a package for reforming the European data pro-
tection framework, in order to modernise the EU legal system for the protection of personal
data, to strengthen individuals' rights, and ensure a free flow of personal data within the EU, and
to improve the clarity and coherence of the EU rules, in compliance with Art. 16 TFEU and Arts 7
and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). The package includes a 'Proposal for a
Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data' and a 'Proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of pre-
vention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and the free movement of such data'. The proposed regulation, which is currently
under discussion, contains a definition of 'genetic data' in Article 4, and Article 9, building on
Article 8 of the Directive 95/46/EC, specifically prohibits the processing of inter alia genetic data
(although allowing for exceptions).
16 <http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/priorities/07/index en.htm>.
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B Genetic Discrimination in the Current EU Legal Framework
I The 'State ofArt'
Before considering whether, why, and how the EU could enact legislation to
address genetic discrimination, it is worth appraising the extent to which genetic
discrimination is currently addressed in the EU legal framework.
In the EU constitutional framework, the principle of non-discrimination and
equality is firmly embedded in the Treaties. Article 2 TEU on the values of the EU
states that the Union is founded, inter alia, on equality, and that "[t]hese values
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimi-
nation, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men
prevail". Article 3 TEU states that the EU "shall combat social exclusion and dis-
crimination". Article 9 TEU mentions the equality of citizens in the European
institutions, and Article 21 TEU sets forth the respect of the principle of equality
in EU external action. Although these articles do not create any legal rights, their
prominent position in the TEU shows that the EU is committed to ensure equal-
ity. 17 Article 10 TFEU contains a horizontal clause on non-discrimination 18 and
provides the EU with a legal basis for the EU non-discrimination legislation. Arti-
cle 19 TFEU (former Article 13 EC) allows the EU to take action to combat dis-
crimination on the named grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.
However, none of the Treaty provisions mention genetic data, nor health as
grounds of discrimination. By contrast, 'genetic features' is included as a ground
of discrimination in Article 21 EU CFR. The EU CFR establishes a right to equality
before the law and a prohibition of discrimination on a wider list of grounds than
Article 19 TFEU, and this list is extensive and open-ended, as will be clear from
the words "any grounds such as".19 Nevertheless, as clarified in the Explanation of
the Charter, Article 21 EU CFR does not create any power to enact anti-discrimi-
nation laws in the areas of competence of Member States, nor does it lay down a
sweeping ban of discrimination in wide-ranging areas.
Having regard to secondary legislation, former Article 13 EC (i.e. Article 19
TFEU) has been the legal base for a second generation of equality directives (so-
called 'Article 13 Directives'), which build upon the experience gained in the legis-
17 E. Howard, 'EU Equality Law: Three Recent Developments', ELJ, Vol. 17, 2011, pp. 785-803;
E. Ellis & P. Watson, EUAnti-Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press 2012.
18 Article 10 TFEU reads as follows: '[i]n defining and implementing its policies and activities, the
Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation'.
19 Howard 2011, p. 787.
18 European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 1
doi: 10.5553/EJLR/138723702015017001002
Regulating Genetic Discrimination in the European Union
lation to combat gender and other forms of discrimination at the EU level.20
Among the non-discrimination instruments, the most relevant in this context
and for the purpose of the subsequent analysis is the Directive 2000/78/EC of 27
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation ('Employment Equality Directive'). As provided for in Arti-
cle 1 of this Employment Equality Directive, its purpose is
to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Mem-
ber States the principle of equal treatment.
There is a significant amount of literature on the Employment Equality Directive,
and several CJEU's decisions have shaped the meaning and the scope of its provi-
sions. For the purpose of this analysis, it suffices to point out that this directive
bans both direct discrimination (differential treatment based on a specific charac-
teristic) and indirect discrimination (any provision, criterion, or practice which is
neutral on its face but is liable to adversely affect one or more specific individuals
or incite discrimination). Settled CJEU case law states that the principle of non-
discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differ-
ently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way, and a dif-
ferent treatment may be justified only if it is based on objective considerations
and only if it is proportionate to the legitimate objective being pursued. 2 ' Harass-
ment, which creates a hostile environment, is also deemed to be discrimination.
The Employment Equality Directive requires Member States to provide for effec-
tive judicial remedies, bestow representative associations with locus standi to
bring actions on behalf of individuals, contain rules on the reversal proof, and
provide for sanctions. Notably, the Employment Equality Directive imposes only
minimum requirements and allows Member States to apply provisions which are
more favourable to the protection of equal treatment, than those laid down in the
Directive.
As it appears from Article 1, the Employment Equality Directive covers six
grounds of discrimination, and it does not include genetic features among them.
The question is provoked whether this missing ground is an obstacle to ensuring
20 These Directives include: Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16; Directive
2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22; Council Directive 2004/113/EC imple-
menting the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of
goods and services of 13 December 2004 [2004] OJ L; Directive 2006/54/EC of the EP and of the
Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L
204/23.
21 Case C-148/02 Carlos GarciaAvelo v. Etat Be/ge [2003] ECR 1-11613.
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protection from discrimination based solely on the nature of an individual's geno-
type.
It might be argued that a broad understanding of the concept of disability
discrimination could also cover genetic discrimination. It is outside the scope of
this article to explore the link between disability and genetics in depth: we limit
ourselves to note that genetic testing can potentially predict a low or high proba-
bility of future disability or can predict that certain genotypes will indicate disa-
bility in the future. The Employment Equality Directive could accordingly cover
under 'disability discrimination' and any other discrimination on the ground of
the prediction of future illness or future loss of functions in a currently asympto-
matic individual or on the ground of a genetic susceptibility to future health prob-
lems.
At present, there is no definition of disability in the Employment Equality
Directive, nor in other pieces of legislation. Thus, there are no textual arguments
against such a wide interpretation.
It is noted that this wide interpretation would be in line with Article 21 EU
CFR, which by virtue of Article 6(1) TEU has a constitutional value. In addition,
such an extensive interpretation would be in compliance with the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter 'the Convention' and the
'CRPD'), ratified by the EU by means of the Council decision of 26 November
2009.22
In this respect, it must be recalled that Article 1 CRPD states that
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
with others.
This is not a strict definition (it is placed in the article on 'Purpose' rather than
under Article 2 on 'Definitions'), and it is non-exhaustive. This means that imple-
menting legislation should treat disability as a socially constructed phenomenon
and could include among disabled people short-term conditions but also genetic
differences. Article 2 defines "Discrimination on the basis of disability" as follows:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has
the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It
includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommo-
dation.
22 Council Decision 2010/48/EC, [2010] OJ L 23/35.
20 European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 1
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The quoted wide-ranging notion of discrimination covers not only persons with
actual disabilities but also persons who, while not having a disability presently,
might acquire a disability in the future or persons who simply are perceived as
having a disability.
The CRPD currently enjoys a quasi-constitutional status in the EU legal sys-
tem beneath the Treaties but above secondary law. As a consequence, EU secon-
dary law must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with the CRPD: if the wording of secondary EU legislation is open to more than
one interpretation, preference should be given, as far as possible, to the interpre-
tation which renders the European provision consistent with the Convention.
23
The CJEU has recognised the existence of this duty of consistent interpretation,
by virtue of the 'sub-constitutional' rank of international agreements in the EU,
independently of the direct effect of the international law provisions concerned.
24
Up to now, the CJEU has not been confronted with any question regarding
the potential of the Directive to be extended to genetic discrimination. However,
the Court has released a few decisions on disability discrimination. In the absence
of a legislative definition, the CJEU, at first,25 had adopted a narrow concept of
disability, based on the antiquated medical model of disability, 26 and had clearly
distinguished sickness from disability.2 7 In Chacon Navas, the Court clarified that
fundamental rights which form an integral part of the general principles of EU
law include the general principle of non-discrimination, but
23 Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR 1-3989, para 52. See F. Casolari, 'Giving Indi-
rect Effect to International Law within the EU Legal Order: The Doctrine of Consistent Interpre-
tation', in E. Cannizzaro et al. (Eds.), International Law as Law of the European Union, Martinus
Nijhoff 2011, pp. 394-422.
24 Case C-335/05, Rizeni Letoveho Provozu CR, s. p. v. Bundesamt fir Finanzen [2007] ECR 1-4307,
para 52. Case 92/71, Interfood GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg [1972] ECR 231, para 6. See also
D. Ferri, 'The Conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by the
EC/EU: A Constitutional Perspective', in L. Waddington & G. Quinn (Eds.), European Yearbook of
Disability Law, Vol. 2, Intersentia 2010, p. 47.
25 Case C-13/05, Sonia Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectiviclades SA [2006] ECR. 1-6467.
26 The medical model tends to view persons with disabilities as objects who are to be managed or
cared for, while the society emphasizes respect for the equal human rights of persons with disa-
bilities. See C. Barnes & G. Mercer, Exploring Disability, Cambridge, Polity Press 2010.
As noted by Waddington, according to the CJEU the cause of the disadvantage is the
'impairment' which an individual has. Therefore, the problem lies in the impaired individual and
not in the reaction of society to the impairment or the organization of society. This model can be
contrasted with a social model of disability, which is reflected in the CRPD. The social model is
based on a socio-political approach which argues that disability stems primarily from the failure
of the social environment to adjust to the needs and aspirations of people with impairments.
L. Waddington, 'Equal to the Task? Re-Examining EU Equality Law in Light of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities', in Waddington et al. 2013,
pp. 169-200.
27 L. Waddington, 'Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, judgment of the Grand
Chamber of 11 July 2006', Common Market Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2007, pp. 487-499.
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it does not follow from this that the scope of Directive 2000/78 should be
extended by analogy beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed
exhaustively in Article 1 thereof.
However, most recently, the CJEU has embraced a more wide-ranging definition
of disability openly in line with Article 1 CRPD and reflective of the social model
of disability.
In Ring and Werge,28 the CJEU openly distanced itself from the position it
took in Chacon Navas and interpreted the definition of disability in light of the
CRPD. Another case, in line with Ring and Werge, is Commission v. Italy.29 The case
originated from action for failure to fulfil EU obligations brought by the Commis-
sion against Italy. The Commission affirmed that Italy did not correctly transpose
Directive 2000/78 into its national law, and, in particular, it did not ensure, in
breach of the Directive, that reasonable accommodation in the workplace is to
apply to all persons with disabilities, all employers, and all aspects of the employ-
ment relationship. In its decision the CJEU confirmed that, while it is true that
the concept of a 'disability' is not directly defined in the Employment Equality
Directive, it should be interpreted on the basis of the CRPD. Most recently, in
Z. v. A Government Department and The Board of management of a community school,
the CJEU held that the CRPD "is capable of being relied on for the purposes of
interpreting Directive 2000/78, which must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a
manner that is consistent with that Convention".30 The Court also confirmed that
the concept of disability within the meaning of Directive 2000/78 had to be
understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from long-term
physical, mental, or psychological impairments which in interaction with various
barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in
professional life on an equal basis with other workers.
Even though the CJEU has shown to embrace a relatively wide definition of
disability, it has constantly held that
the scope of Directive 2000/78 cannot be extended beyond the discrimina-
tion based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 of the directive,
with the result that a person who has been dismissed by his employer solely
on account of sickness cannot fall within the scope of the general framework
established by Directive 2000/78.
3 1
We can conclude that 'genetic features' is a missing ground in the Employment
Equality Directive (as well as in Article 19 TFEU). However, the particular cases of
28 Join cases C- 335/11 and C- 337/11, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyt-
tigt Boligselskab (C-335/11) and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, in liquidation (C-337/11) 11 April 2013,
not yet published.
29 Case C-312/11, Commission v Italy, 4 July 2013, not yet reported.
30 Case C-363/12 Z. v A Government Department and The Board of management of a community school,
not yet published
31 Case C- 303/06 Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR 1-5603.
22 European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 1
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Ring and Werge and Commission v. Italy leave the door open to the wide interpreta-
tion of the Employment Equality Directive in light of the CRPD to also cover
genetic discrimination in the field of employment under disability discrimination.
II The Proposal for a New Non-Discrimination Directive: 'Old Wine in a New
Bottle'
Almost six years ago, in 2008, the Commission proposed a new Directive extend-
ing the material scope of the provisions against discrimination on the ground of
religion and belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation beyond the area of
employment in the fields of social protection, including social security and
healthcare; social advantages; education; access to and supply of goods; and other
services which are available to the public, including housing.3 2 The proposed
Directive replicates those parts of the material scope of the Race Equality Direc-
tive that were not included in the Employment Equality Directive. However, as
noted by Howard, the scope is still less wide than that of the Race Directive, as
Article 3 of the Proposal contains more exceptions.3 3 Waddington, in her analysis
of the proposal, underlines that many Member States are still querying the extent
of the EU's power to legislate in areas such as health and social protection, and
this makes the scope of the proposal blurred and still vague.
The original text of the proposal follows the pattern of the existing Direc-
tives, with few notable exceptions. For instance, as underlined by Bell, the most
striking novelty lies in the definition of discrimination: the proposal conceptual-
ises 'denial of reasonable accommodation' as a form of discrimination, in compli-
ance with the CRPD. a4 However, the proposal as it stands does not mention
genetic features and replicates the choice of the existing Directives in not provid-
ing any definition of the discrimination grounds. As recalled by Bell, this choice
was particularly contested in relation to disability.
3 5
The European Parliament released a 'Legislative Resolution to the Proposal'
in which it proposes a number of amendments.3 6 These include adding the refer-
ence to the fact that the Directive complies with the CRPD (Recital 2b of the Pre-
amble) and a provision that would make clear that assumptive discrimination (i.e.
discrimination against someone because the discriminator thinks they have a par-
ticular religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation) is included (Arti-
cle 4 para 4a). Another interesting amendment suggested by the European Parlia-
ment is to add to Article 4(1) of the Directive a sentence that makes it clear that
32 COM (2008) 426. M. Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, Oxford University
Press 2005; L. Waddington,'Future Prospects for EU Equality Law. Lessons to Be Learnt from the
Proposed Equal Treatment Directive', European Law Review, Vol. 2, 2011, pp. 163-84; Ellis &
Watson 2012, p. 3 7 2 .
33 Howard 2011, pp. 785, 789.
34 M. Bell, 'Advancing EU Anti- Discrimination Law: The European Commission's 2008 Proposal for
a New Directive', Equal Rights Review, Vol. 3, 2009, pp. 7-10.
35 Ibid., p. 8.
36 P6_TA(2009)0211 European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 2 April 2009 on the Proposal
for a Council Directive Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Person Irrespec-
tive of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation (COM (2008)0426-C6-291/
2008-2008/0140(CNS)).
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'disability' is understood in the light of the CRPD, which includes persons with
chronic diseases. However, no attempts to include genetic features as a ground of
discrimination or to mention genetic discrimination have been made.
If approved as it stands, it is unlikely that the text will advance the protection
of EU citizens from genetic discrimination. Genetic discrimination should be
again covered under the umbrella concept of disability. Analogously, in the event
the amendments proposed by the Parliament are approved, no clear protection
against a more disadvantageous treatment on the sole ground of genetic data is
given. The direct reference to the CRPD could favour the extensive interpretation
of the ground of disability, and the inclusion of a provision on assumptive dis-
crimination could also facilitate the protection against genetic discrimination,
given that the discriminatory treatment is based on perceived - not actual - disa-
bility. But, again, in any event, a key role will be left to the CJEU.
Finally, even if the Court ruled that genetic discrimination would be covered
by the Directive, the text (as it stands now) contains an exception which is likely
to hamper protection in the insurance context. Article 2(7) authorises "propor-
tionate differences in treatment" in financial services, provided that "age or disa-
bility is a key factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate
actuarial or statistical data". In the explanatory memorandum, the Commission
argues that "the use of age or disability by insurers and banks to assess the risk
profile of customers does not necessarily represent discrimination: it depends on
the product". This wording, at least potentially, could be used to allow insurance
companies to charge individuals different rates or vary coverage based on genetic
predisposition, or even to discourage some at-risk individuals from getting an
insurance contract.
It is too soon to formulate any concluding remarks on this proposal. At this
stage, it is fairly unclear whether and when the text will be adopted. Even less
clear is whether the text will be modified again by the Council, whether any of the
amendments proposed by the Parliament will be approved and implemented in
the final text. The proposed directive has been examined in the Council for more
than four years now, and discussion is still needed on a number of issues, such as
the division of competences, the overall scope and subsidiarity, and the disability
provisions. Future debates could hopefully bring some developments in the text.
Although the inclusion of genetic features as ground of discrimination seems
quite challenging, the provision on assumptive discrimination proposed by the
Parliament could be made clearer and more explicit.
However, even in the best-case scenario, the proposed Directive appears inad-
equate to address and prevent the misuse of genetic data outside the employment
context.
C The Way Forward: A New EU ad hoc Directive?
I Filling in the Gaps?
Currently the EU does not provide any satisfactory protection against the misuse
of genetic information: there is no concrete protection against genetic discrimina-
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tion in the employment context, and there is actually no defense outside the
employment context. As mentioned above, there is currently a reform process
taking place in the EU in the area of data protection law, and there is a new non-
discrimination directive under discussion. However, none of them address
genetic discrimination.
Having highlighted the inadequacy of the current legal framework, the ques-
tion on whether or not the EU should adopt a specific regulation to combat and
prevent the misuse (or discriminatory use) of genetic data is linked to three main
issues: first, the desirability and the appropriateness of an ad hoc legislative
instrument, second, the desirability of non-discriminatory approach, and, third
and more specifically, the feasibility of an EU genetic-discrimination directive.
II 'Genetic Exceptionalism': Some Theoretical Considerations
The desirability of an ad hoc piece of legislation is based on the very nature of
genetic data and on its difference in comparison to other types of data, which is
commonly known as 'genetic exceptionalism'.
3 7
'Genetic exceptionalism' was first advanced by Thomas Murray, who based
his reflection upon the concept of 'HIV Exceptionalism', which viewed HIV as
exceptional, based on the potential for discrimination and stigmatisation.
3 8
Against the backdrop of advancing technology, genetic exceptionalism conceives
genetic information as deserving special non-discrimination, privacy protections
(or other protections), in light of the fact that it is inherently unique and differ-
ent from other forms of personal or health information. Although this view has
been contested,3 9 we contend that there are several reasons to embrace it.
Firstly, it is commonly acknowledged that genetic data uniquely identifies an
individual, and such information can reveal a myriad of personal details, includ-
ing current and (potential) future health status, physical appearance, as well as
behavioural and other traits. 40 As Somek states, "[i]f there is anything special
about our genes, from a sociological perspective, then it is the potential to make
known, possibly, the naked truth about our present condition and our future des-
tiny". Even if we reject the idea of mere 'genetic determinism', or the concept that
our genes exclusively predict individual fate and are an individual's 'future diary',
37 See generally T.H. Murray, 'Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries": Is Genetic Information
Different from Other Medical Information', in M.A. Rothstein (Ed.), Genetic Secrets: Protecting
Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic, Yale University Press 1997. See also G.J. Annas, 'Genetic
Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law', Texas Review of Law and Policy, Vol. 4, 1999, pp. 9-11. For
further discussion see M.A. Rothstein, 'Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism',
JLME, 2007, p. 59; C.S. Diver & J.M. Cohen, 'Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic Discrimi-
nation?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 149, 2000-2001, p. 1439.
38 Murray 1997; R. Bayer, 'Public Health Policy and the AIDs Epidemic: An End to HIV Exceptional-
ism?, NEJM, Vol. 324, 1991, pp. 1500-1504.
39 M.A. Rothstein, 'Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism', Hastings Center Report,
No. 4, 2005, pp. 27-33; S. Suter, 'The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need
Special Genetics Legislation?', Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 3, 2001, p. 669.
40 G. Laurie, 'The Most Personal Information of All: An Appraisal of Genetic Privacy in the Shadow
of the Human Genome Project', International Journal of Law, Policy and Family, Vol. 10, 1996,
pp. 74-101.
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it appears generally acknowledged that genetic information effectively "informs
our younger selves about our aging selves".
4 1
Secondly, genetic information is different from other medical information, in
that it reveals sensitive information not only about an individual but also about
that individual's relatives. The familial nature of genetic information necessarily
gives rise to additional considerations in relation to privacy, for example, in the
context of reproduction.
42
Another unique element of genetic information relates to the fact that it is
immutable. 4 In addition to the unique nature of genetic data, another reason in
support of genetic exceptionalism relates to the stigma associated with genetic
information. Legal scholarship has noted often that the misuse of genetic infor-
mation has led to discrimination, eugenics, and, in certain circumstances, has
exacerbated racism.44 In light of this stigma attached to genetic predisposition to
disease and genetic conditions, discrimination or other misuse of genetic infor-
mation should be specifically prohibited. Although a detailed discussion of this
argument is outside the scope of this article, it suffices to point out that, in the
absence of explicit protections, this may lead to the practice of genetic cleansing
and the potential relegation of what are deemed to be genetically undesirable
individuals.
45
Another (perhaps less convincing) reason in favour of singling out genetic
information and genetic discrimination in the regulation relates to the expressive
value of the law. 46 Although this is primarily a rhetoric argument, it acknowledges
the merit of a specific body of law acting as a tool to engrain a strong moral mes-
sage in society that a certain practice or behaviour is wrong and will not be toler-
ated.
Each of the above arguments, taken individually, may not necessarily carry
significant weight.47 However, collectively they formulate a strong case in favour
of genetic exceptionalism and a genetic-specific approach in addressing the regu-
lation of this area.
41 Annas 1999, pp. 9-11. Annas uses the analogy of genetic information as a "future diary" which he
takes from William Safire's explanation of diaries, which "inform our aging selves about our
younger selves". W. Safire, 'Sleazy Senate Inquiry', New York Times, 25 October 1993, p. 19.
42 A. Somerville & V. English, 'Genetic Privacy: Orthodoxy or Oxymoron?', JME, Vol. 25, 1999,
pp. 144-145.
43 Suter 2001, pp. 669-706.
44 K.L. Garver & B. Garver, 'The Human Genome Project and Eugenic Concerns', American Journal of
Human Genetics, Vol. 54, 1994, p. 148; L.B. Andrews, 'Past as Prologue: Sobering Thoughts on
Genetic Enthusiasm', Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 27, 1997, p. 893.
45 D. Hellman, 'What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?', in V. Gehring (Ed.), Genetic Pros-
pects: Essays on Biotechnology, Ethics and Public Policy, Rowman and Littlefield 2003, pp. 90-91.
46 A. de Paor, 'Regulating Genetic Information - Exploring the Options in Legal Theory', EJHL,
Vol. 21, 2014, pp. 425-453.
47 L.P. Francis, 'You Are Born with Your Genes: Justice and Protection against Discrimination in
the Use of Genetic Information', Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine, Vol. 77, No. 2, 2010,
pp. 188-190.
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III The Desirability of a Non-Discrimination Approach
Having discussed the desirability of an ad hoc piece of legislation, the question on
whether the EU should ban genetic discrimination is linked to the desirability and
appropriateness of a non-discrimination regulatory approach as a type of norma-
tive intervention that is ultimately most likely to promote virtuous behaviour and
discourage undesirable practices in third party contexts such as employment, as
well as in society in general.
Genetic discrimination has been defined as the unjustified unequal treatment
of persons owing to their genetic characteristics. 48 When investigating genetic
discrimination, it has been often acknowledged that the main areas of interest are
screening and diagnostic testing and that the danger is that different genetic fea-
tures emerging from the testing might be interpreted as defining different 'kinds'
of people and as defining different 'values' of people. Genetic discrimination is
most likely to take the form of disadvantages in employment 49 and increase of
premium or indeed denial of insurance coverage. 50 The protection of genetic data,
i.e. a privacy approach, which aims to protect access to and disclosure of an indi-
vidual's genetic information, seems insufficient to prevent these discriminatory
uses of genetic information. While privacy ensures security and confidentiality in
both information and personal space and safeguards the dignity and integrity of
individuals by protecting that which is considered important and private, a 'pri-
vacy approach' in itself does not prevent the potential that the individual may be
treated in a more disadvantageous way than another comparable individual
"solely or primarily because of his/her genotype or because of a specific genetic
defect, without there being a sufficient and reasonable justification for such dis-
advantageous treatment".
5 1
Privacy laws generally operate by requiring consent from the relevant party
to access or control his/her genetic information. Third parties can access such
information by way of obtaining consent from the individual in question. Simi-
48 J. Gerards, 'General Issues Concerning Genetic Information', in J.H. Gerards, A.W. Heringa &
H.L. Janssen (Eds.), Genetic Discrimination and Genetic Privacy in a Comparative Perspective, Inter-
sentia 2005, p. 24.
49 Stefanini 2008; A. Trojsi, 'Biodiritto del lavoro > e tutela antidiscriminatoria: i Dati genetici del
lavoratore', 2009. Available at <www.biodiritto.org/images/progetto/TROJSI.pdf> (accessed
30 November 2013); Lemke 2013.
50 T. Lemke, 'Beyond Genetic Discrimination. Problems and Perspectives of a Contested Notion',
Genomics, Society and Policy, 2005, pp. 22-40; M. Viola de Azevedo Cunha, Market Integration
through Data Protection: An Analysis of the Insurance and Financial Industries in the EU, Springer
2013; E.A. Adjin-Tettey, 'Potential for Genetic Discrimination in Access to Insurance: Is There a
Dark Side to Increased Availability of Genetic Information?', Alberta Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 3,
2013, p. 577.
Another relevant field in which the use of genetic data is relevant is the forensic science and the
criminal procedure filed, but this is outside the scope of this paper. See L. Scaffardi, 'Legal Protec-
tion and Ethical Management of Genetic Databases: Challenges of the European Process of Har-
monization', Jean Monnet Working Papers, 2008. Available at <www.astrid-online.it/Documenti/
Privacy/estratto-scaffardi-new-york.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2014). G. Barbujani & F. Tassi,
'Genetic Data in Forensic Science: Use, Misuse and Abuse', in R. Bin & N. Lucchi (Eds.), Biotech
Innovations and Fundamental Rights, Springer 2012, pp. 243-260.
51 Gerards 2005, p. 24.
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larly, the individual may refuse to consent in which case the third party cannot
access the information.52 However, the discriminatory use of genetic data might
happen in several different circumstances: for example, where an employer,
insurer, or other third party inadvertently comes across details of an individual's
genetic information, for example, through a family member's obituary in a news-
paper, through other publically available resources, or through casual conversa-
tion with an individual; or where an individual has disclosed or has been obliged
to disclose his/her genetic information; where the individual consents to the dis-
closure of genetic information; or where such disclosure may be lawful in the
employment context for health and safety purposes.
The use of a non-discrimination approach to address the regulation of genetic
information may encompass unfavourable treatment on the basis of perceived
disability or perceived genetic defects to protect individuals against genetic dis-
crimination, as well as to prevent the creation of a genetic underclass. From an
individual perspective, non-discrimination law is therefore concerned with
addressing unfavourable or unfair treatment, for example, on the basis of one's
genetic information. From a societal perspective, the non-discrimination frame-
work aims to address power relations and structural inequities in society. 53 As a
result of societal inequities and structures, certain dominant groups may be the
primary recipients of equality and fundamental rights while certain minority
groups may encounter barriers to accessing fundamental human rights and equal-
ity. 54 In the current debate, the non-discrimination tool may operate to prevent
the creation of a genetic underclass (and the relegation of genetically undesirable
individuals) and deter the practice of genetic cleansing in society.
IV Is the EU Competent to Act?
Having discussed the theoretical desirability of genetic discrimination legislation,
the most relevant and indeed most challenging question in this respect is whether
the EU actually has the competence to adopt such a specific piece of legislation.
From 1997 (when former Article 13 EC was added), the EU has acquired a
solid cross-cutting competence on non-discrimination on different grounds, in
addition to the nationality and sex one which affirmed first.55 As mentioned
above, the TFEU contains a horizontal clause on non-discrimination in Article 10
TFEU and provides the EU with a legal basis for EU non-discrimination legisla-
tion. However, EU action can only be taken in those areas which fall within the
limits of the powers conferred by the Treaty. Even though "what falls within the
52 J. Roberts, 'The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law',
Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 2011, p. 617.
53 A. Hendriks, 'The UN Disability Convention and (Multiple) Discrimination: Should EU Non-Dis-
crimination Law Be Modelled Accordingly?', in Quinn & Waddington 2010, p. 10.
54 Ibid., p. 10. See also G. Quinn, 'Disability Discrimination Law in the EU', in H. Meenan (Ed.),
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union - Understanding the Article 13 Directives, Cambridge
University Press 2007, pp. 243-246.
55 E. Ellis, EUAnti-Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press 2005; D. Martin, Egalite et non-dis-
crimination dans la jurisprudence communotaire, Buylant 2006.
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scope of EU law differs depending on the context and on what idea the scope of
EU law is based"56 roughly speaking, we can state that employment and insurance
fall within the scope of EU powers.
57
It is noted that Article 19 TFEU, which is the legal basis for non-discrimina-
tion acts, does not mention 'genetic information' or 'health' as a prohibited
ground.
The modification of Article 19 TFEU to include a new ground of discrimina-
tion is to be excluded since the procedure set forth in Article 48 TEU would be
long and complex. As underlined in Section 4 with regard to the Employment
Equality Directive, there would be the possibility that discrimination on grounds
of genetic makeup is covered by the wider ground of (future) disability. 58 Whilst
such a wide interpretation might be almost 'taken for given' with regard to the
Directive, having regard to the latest CJEU's decision, it should not be expected
too easily in regard to Article 19 TFEU. There is no obligation to interpret the
Treaties in light of the CRPD. This is evident inter alia in Microsoft,59 when the
Court of First Instance rejected the argument of the applicant, according to which
former Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU) had to be interpreted in the light of
the TRIPS Agreement. The Court held
that the principle of consistent interpretation [...] invoked by the Court of
Justice applies only where the international agreement at issue prevails over
the provision of Community law concerned. Since an international agreement
[...] does not prevail over primary Community law, that principle does not
apply where, as here, the provision which falls to be interpreted is Article 82
EC.
However, the conclusion of the CRPD by the EU provides an added dimension to
the debate of regulating genetic information and arguably acts as an impetus to
action in this area and as an international standard from which to view the issue
of disability discrimination. 60 In addition, Article 19 TFEU might be a suitable
56 M. Derlen & J. Lindholm, 'Three Ideas: The Scope of EU Law Protecting against Discrimination',
in M. Derlen & J. Lindholm (Eds.), Volume in Honor of Par Hallstr6m Uppsala, lustus 2012,
pp. 77-97. Available: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114247> (accessed 30 November 2013).
57 The EU has a shared competence in the field of employment (covering freedom of movement,
equal treatment, working conditions, including working time, part-time and fixed-term work,
and posting of workers, information and consultation of workers, including in the event of col-
lective redundancies and transfers of undertakings) and has also a solid competence in the field
of insurance within the realisation of the internal market (freedom of movement of services and
capitals). Currently, the TFEU considers insurance in Article 58 para. 2 (liberalisation of banking
and insurance). Article 58 para 2 reads as follows: "The liberalisation of banking and insurance
services connected with movements of capital shall be effected in step with the liberalisation of
movement of capital."
58 J. Gerards & H. Janssen, 'Regulation of Genetic and Other Health Information in a Comparative
Perspective', EJHL, Vol. 13, 2006, pp. 372-374.
59 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission [2007] E.C.R. II-3601 [798].
60 A. de Paor, 'US and EU Perspectives on Genetic Discrimination in Employment and Insurance:
Striking a Balance in a Battlefield of Competing Rights?', in Waddington et al. 2013, p. 143.
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legal basis for a directive on genetic discrimination if its content is interpreted in
light of Article 21 EU CFR. Although the Charter does not alter the extent of pow-
ers granted under Article 19 TFEU, it has, by virtue of Article 6(1) TEU, the same
legal value as the Treaties. As a consequence, respect for fundamental rights is a
legal requirement, subject to the scrutiny of the CJEU, and a condition of the law-
fulness of EU acts.61 The Commission in its Strategy on Smart Regulation 62 and in
the Communication on Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights 63 affirmed that the Charter should be taken into account
throughout the policy cycle. Again, the CJEU would play a vital role in enforcing
the potential of the Charter in the protection of EU citizens from genetic discrim-
ination. As highlighted by Howard, in line with other scholars,
although the Charter does not create new rights, both the way the Charter
itself is interpreted by the Court of Justice and the way this Court could use it
to interpret other provisions of EU law could extend the existing rights and
the protection against discrimination in new directions.
64
It seems that Article 19 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 21 EU CFR and the
CRPD could certainly be an appropriate legal base for a new ad hoc piece of legis-
lation.
In case of a directive on non-discrimination on grounds of genetic data, a
double legal basis could also offer a viable solution. It is worth recalling that the
choice of the legal base for a measure may not depend simply on an institution's
conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors
which are amenable to judicial review.65 In general, if an EU measure has more
than one purpose and one of the purposes can be identified as the main or pre-
dominant purpose, then that measure must be adopted on the legal base corre-
sponding with that main purpose. Only exceptionally, when a measure has more
than one purpose without one being secondary, it can be based on more than one
legal base ('dual legal base').
A well-tailored piece of legislation banning genetic discrimination in the
fields of employment and access to goods and services would create a level playing
field on the use of genetic information by business operators. In doing so, it
would enhance the functioning of the internal market. Therefore, together with
Article 19 TFEU, an additional legal basis could be found in Article 114 TFEU
(which aims to ensure the effective functioning of the internal market in the EU).
Article 114 previously acted as the legal basis for various pieces of legislation
which include a disability dimension, and also the concluding decision of the
CRPD was based on both Article 19 and 114 TFEU (former Article 13 and 95
61 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR 1-11063.
62 COM(2010) 543 final.
63 COM(2010) 573 final.
64 Howard 2011, pp. 785-803; Ellis & Watson 2012.
65 Case C-11/88, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,
[1989] ECR 3799.
30 European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 1
doi: 10.5553/EJLR/138723702015017001002
Regulating Genetic Discrimination in the European Union
EC). 66 The latter example, in particular, might offer an influential precedent and
inspire a double-based proposal.
D Conclusion
A wide range of genetic technologies are becoming increasingly more accessible,
offering growing health benefits, but also presenting complex ethical and legal
challenges. One of the emerging 21st-century challenges is deciphering the appro-
priate mode and means of regulating this area. "Genetics is intrinsically norma-
tive" and "tells us what to expect and what not to expect under given circumstan-
ces", but "this should not dictate the values we should endorse", 67 which should
be protected by an appropriate legislative response. Such a response should pre-
vent the abuse of genetic technologies, which would ultimately lead to the viola-
tion of a myriad of human rights whilst allowing the advance of genetic science.
In the early 1990s, legal scholarship (particularly in the United States) had
already indicated that the use of genetic tests could lead to discrimination based
solely on the nature of an individual's genotype. 68 But in addition to the academic
discourse, there has been a growing awareness that the spread of genetic testing
brings with it the risk of discrimination. 69 Around the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, national laws were passed to prevent genetic discrimination in some of the
EU Member States, but no action was taken by the EU.
Even by exploiting the potential of interpretation of existing legislation by
including discrimination on grounds of genetic makeup in the wider ground of
(future) disability, the Employment Equality Directive offers a low degree of pro-
tection due to its limited scope. The 2008 Proposal for a New Equality Directive
ignores genetic discrimination and provides very little innovation in this regard.
Hence, even if approved (and this result cannot be taken for granted), the text
hypothetically offers poor safeguard.
Although further analysis, discussion, and debate of this issue is required
amongst the relevant stakeholders, policymakers, and other interested groups,
the preferable way forward appears a new single ground directive to ban any dis-
advantageous treatment of an individual based solely or primarily because of his/
her genotype or because of a specific genetic defect. The EU has competence to
legislate, in line with its commitment to equality, to ensure an internal market
without any barriers, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well
as with international obligations the EU has engaged in. The potential for a dual
legal basis for action in this field, which would highlight the objective of promot-
ing the economic aims of the Union, enhance the operation of the internal mar-
66 Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European
Community of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2010]
OJ L 23/35.
67 HGC, supra n. 7.
68 Inter alia, L.O. Gostin, 'Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and
Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers', AJLM, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 & 2, 1991, p. 109.
69 Rothstein & Knoppers 1996, pp. 143-161.
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ket, and address the issue of discrimination and the objective of equality for all
citizens, seems to (at least potentially) mitigate the risk that some Member States
question the EU competence. In any event, the adoption of a specific legislation
seems the preferable avenue to pursue in order for the EU to usher in the new era
of genetic evolution.
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